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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued thirteen
trademark decisions in 2014, six of which are precedential,1 while the
other seven are nonprecedential.2 Eight of the thirteen decisions
involved primarily substantive issues,3 while the remaining five
involved mostly procedural issues.4 All except one of the decisions
involved appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).' The
remaining decision was based on an appeal from a U.S. district
court.6  Six of the TTAB appeals were based on opposition
proceedings,7 three were based on cancellation proceedings,8 and
three were ex parte appeals of registration refusals.9
1. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2014); StonCor Grp., Inc. v.
Specialty Coatings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Nordic Naturals, Inc.,
755 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co.,
753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015); In re Geller, 751
F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Geller v. Patent & Trademark Office, 135 S.
Ct. 944 (2015); Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
2. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F. App'x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Longshore v. Retail Royalty Co., 589 F. App'x 963 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cutino v.
Nightlife Media, Inc., 575 F. App'x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); S. Snow Mfg.
Co. v. Snowizard Holdings, Inc., 567 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cigar King, LLC
v. Corporacion Habanos, S.A., 560 F. App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2014); M.Z. Berger & Co.
v. Swatch AG, 559 F. App'x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Gutier v. Hugo Boss Trade Mark
Mgmt. GMbH & Co. KG, 555 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
3. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747; In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F.
App'x 997; Longshore, 589 F. App'x 963; StonCor, 759 F.3d 1327; S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567
F. App'x 945; In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d 1340; In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355;
Stone Lion, 746 F.3d 1317.
4. Cutino, 575 F. App'x 888; Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d 1270; Cigar
King, LLC, 560 F. App'x 999; M.Z. Berger & Co., 559 F. App'x 1009; Gutier, 555 F.
App'x 947.
5. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747; In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F.
App'x 997; Longshore, 589 F. App'x 963; Cutino, 575 F. App'x 888; StonCor, 759 F.3d
1327; In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d 1340; Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d
1270; Cigar King, LLC, 560 F. App'x 999; In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355; Stone Lion, 746
F.3d 1317; M.Z. Berger & Co., 559 F. App'x 1009; Gutier, 555 F. App'x 947.
6. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x 945.
7. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F. App'x 997, 998; Longshore, 589 F. App'x
963, 964; Cutino, 575 F. App'x at 888; StonCor, 759 F.3d at 1329; Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at
1319; M.Z. Berger & Co., 559 F. App'x at 1009-10.
8. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d at 1271; Cigar King, LLC, 560 F. App'x at
999; Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 947.
9. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 749; In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d at
1341; In re Gellr, 751 F.3d at 1356.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower tribunal in eight of the
thirteen decisions.'0 It reversed the TTAB in three cases,1' one of
which involved substantive trademark issues.'2 It dismissed the appeal
in one case as moot,3 and it dismissed a cross-appeal in another case
as improper.14 The Federal Circuit considered one matter of first
impression, namely, whether a claim for fraud under section 38 of
the Lanham Act may only be asserted on the basis of a registered
trademark.15 Finally, the Federal Circuit issued another six summary
affirmances in appeals from TTAB proceedings without opinions.6
This Article discusses each of the Federal Circuit's thirteen
trademark opinions in 2014. The discussions are grouped by the
cases' primary issue. The first part of this Article will discuss opinions
that dealt with substantive trademark issues, while the second part will
examine opinions that were primarily focused on procedural issues.
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion
1. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital, LLP
In Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital, LLP,7 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the TTAB's decision to refuse registration of the
mark STONE LION CAPITAL by Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P.
("Stone Lion") on the ground that it created a likelihood of
10. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F. App'x 997, 998; Longshore, 589 F. App'x
963, 964; StonCor, 759 F.3d at 1329; S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 948; In re Nordic
Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d at 1342; In re Geller, 751 F.3d at 1357; Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at
1319; Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 947.
11. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 749; Cutino, 575 F. App'x at 888; Empresa
Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d at 1271.
12. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747.
13. Cigar King, LLC, 560 F. App'x at 999.
14. M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 559 F. App'x 1009, 1009-10 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
15. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 958.
16. Nettadoz Enters. v. Cintron Beverage Grp., LLC, 577 F. App'x 1005, 1006
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Terry v. Newman, 556 F. App'x 964, 965 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (per curiam); Chesapeake Marine Tours, Inc. v. Alcatraz Media, Inc., 565
F. App'x 900, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); C. &J. Clark Int'l Ltd. v. Unity
Clothing Inc., 561 F. App'x 921, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); In re Doctors
Making Housecalls, LLC, 557 F. App'x 1000, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam);
Costantine v. C.F.M. Distrib. Co., 553 F. App'x 1005, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
17. 746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
2015] 969
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confusion with two prior registrations for the marks LION CAPITAL
and LION owned by Lion Capital, LLP ("Lion Capital").l"
Stone Lion, an investment management company, sought
registration of the mark STONE LION CAPITAL based on an intent
to use the mark for "financial services, namely investment advisory
services, management of investment funds, and fund investment
services."19 Lion Capital opposed the application, alleging a
likelihood of confusion under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act 20 with
its prior registration for the mark LION CAPITAL covering "equity
capital investment and venture capital services" and its prior
registration for the mark LION covering "financial and investment
planning and research, investment management services, and capital
investment consultation.
'21
In evaluating Lion Capital's claim, the TTAB applied the
traditional likelihood-of-confusion factors22 set forth in In re E.I.
18. Id. at 1318-19.
19. Id. at 1319.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (providing that a trademark shall not be
refused registration unless it consists of a mark that is "likely... to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive" with an existing registered mark or an existing
mark or name used in the United States).
21. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. The TTAB should consider, among others, the following factors in
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration or in connection with which a
prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.
"impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark,
"family" mark, product mark).
(10)The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark....
(l1)The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of
its mark on its goods.
(12)The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13)Any other established facts probative of the effect of use.
[Vol. 64:967
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DuPont DeNemours & Co.23 The TTAB found that DuPont factors one
through four weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion.24 As to
the first factor, the similarity of the marks, the TTAB found that the
STONE LION CAPITAL mark incorporated the entirety of Lion
Capital's marks, and that the term LION was "the dominant part of
both parties' marks.'2 It further held that the term "STONE" in the
applicant's mark was insufficient to distinguish the marks,25
rendering them "similar in sight, sound, meaning, and overall
commercial impression. "27 With regard to the second factor, the
similarity of services, the TTAB found that at least some of the
services identified in Stone Lion's application were "legally identical"
to those covered by Lion Capital's registrations.28
The TTAB found that the third DuPont factor, the similarity of
trade channels, weighed strongly in support of a likelihood of
confusion because some of the parties' recited services were "legally
identical," leading the TTAB to presume that "the services travel[ed]
[through] the same channels of trade and [were] sold to the same
class of purchasers."
2 9
The fourth DuPont factor also supported a finding of a likelihood
of confusion. While the TTAB recognized that the parties targeted
sophisticated investors, the TTAB was required to consider the
services as set forth in the parties' registrations and application,
which did not limit the services to any particular class of purchaser.30
The TTAB found the remaining DuPont factors on which the
parties presented evidence-namely, the strength of Lion Capital's
Id. at 1319-20 (alteration in original) (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
23. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
24. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1320.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lion Capital LLP v. Stone Lion
Capital Partners, No. 91191681, 2013 WL 2329834, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 18, 2013)
("Although the word 'STONE' appears first in applicant's mark and contributes to
the mark's commercial impression, it is an adjective modifying the noun 'LION,'
which we view as the dominant part of both parties' marks. We find in this case that
the addition of the word 'STONE' is not sufficient to distinguish the marks in the
context of the parties' services, and we find them to be similar in sight, sound,
meaning, and overall commercial impression."), affd, 746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
27. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1320.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. (first and third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
2015]
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marks" and the nature of similar third-party marks3 2-to be neutral."
Weighing the relevant factors, the TTAB held that Lion Capital
established a likelihood of confusion and refused registration of
Stone Lion's mark.4
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Stone Lion first argued that the
TTAB failed to assess the overall commercial impression created by
the STONE LION CAPITAL mark as a whole and instead improperly
dissected the mark and gave undue weight to the shared term
LION.3 5 The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with Stone Lion
and found that the TTAB had properly assessed the similarities
between the marks by giving greater weight to the dominant term
"LION" in both parties' marks and by according less weight to the
term "STONE" in the applicant's mark.6 The Federal Circuit also
rejected Stone Lion's argument that its mark sounded different and
conveyed a different meaning than Lion Capital's "LION" mark.
37
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB did not err in giving
little weight to the fact that Lion Capital had made arguments during
the prosecution of its own application to register the LION CAPITAL
mark to distinguish it from a prior third-party registration for the
mark ROARING LION. 8
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the TTAB's findings on the
third DuPont factor regarding the similarity of trade channels.
39
Stone Lion argued that the TTAB failed to consider the differences
between the types of people within the organizations to which the
parties target their services and that it disregarded evidence that the
31. The TTAB found that Stone Lion failed to demonstrate "that its marks [were]
well-known in the financial services field." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Stone Lion submitted Internet printouts showing third-party investment
entities using "LION" in their name. The TTAB gave little weight to this evidence,
however, holding that "such third-party evidence ... generally has minimal probative
value where, as here, it is not accompanied by any evidence of consumer awareness."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The TI'AB found that "there was not a
crowded field of LION-formative marks" to diminish the strength of Stone Lion's
pleaded marks. Id. at 1320-21.
33. Id. at 1320.
34. Id. at 1321.
35. Id. at 1321-22.
36. Id. at 1322.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Federal Circuit explained that "[a] party's prior arguments may be
considered as 'illuminative of shade and tone in the iotal picture,' but do not alter
the Board's obligation to reach its own conclusion on the record." Id. (quoting
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 576 F.2d 926, 929 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
39. Id. at 1322-23.
972 [Vol. 64:967
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parties' actual investors did not overlap.4" The Federal Circuit found
that it was proper for the TTAB "to focus on the application and
registrations rather than on real-world conditions, because 'the
question of registrability of an applicant's mark must be decided on
the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application."'41
Thus, "[a]n application with 'no restriction on trade channels'
cannot be 'narrowed by testimony that the applicant's use is, in fact,
restricted to a particular class of purchasers."'42
Regarding the fourth DuPont factor, Stone Lion argued that the
TTAB erred in considering the sophistication of the parties'
customers, i.e., sophisticated, high-wealth investors with whom the
parties must already have preexisting relationships due to federal
securities regulations.43 However, the Federal Circuit refused to
disregard the broad scope of services recited in Stone Lion's
application, which was not limited to such consumers but, rather, was
expansive enough to encompass "ordinary consumers seeking to
invest in services with no minimum investment requirement."44
The Federal Circuit concluded that the TTAB properly evaluated
the DuPont factors in reaching its conclusion that Stone Lion's
application created a likelihood of confusion and affirmed the
decision to refuse registration of the STONE LION CAPITAL mark.45
2. StonCor Group, Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc.
In StonCor Group, Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc.,46 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the TTAB's dismissal of StonCor Group Inc.'s ("StonCor")
opposition against an application by Specialty Coatings, Inc.
("Specialty") to register the mark ARMORSTONE based on a
likelihood of confusion with StonCor's prior STONSHIELD mark
and on the grounds that Specialty's mark is merely descriptive.
47
StonCor sells epoxy coatings used on concrete floors and owns a
registration for the mark STONSHIELD for "floors and flooring
systems comprised of epoxy resins... for use in industrial and
40. Id. at 1323.
41. Id. (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
42. Id. (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d at 943).
43. Id. at 1323-24.
44. Id. at 1324-25.
45. Id. at 1325-26.
46. 759 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
47. Id. at 1329.
20151
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institutional applications."48  Its competitor, Specialty, filed an
application for the mark ARMORSTONE for use in connection with
"[e]poxy coating for use on concrete industrial floors. '49 StonCor
opposed Specialty's application alleging, among other things, that its
mark created a likelihood of confusion with StonCor's prior
registered mark and that the ARMORSTONE mark was merely
descriptive of Specialty's goods and was thus not entitled to registration
absent secondary meaning, which Specialty had not shown."
The TTAB considered evidence the parties submitted on ten of the
DuPont factors and found that Specialty's mark did not create a
likelihood of confusion, primarily because the marks "[we]re too
distinct in sound, appearance, and commercial impression."51 The
TTAB found that the first factor, the similarity of the marks, weighed
against a finding of likelihood of confusion.2 Specifically, the TTAB
concluded that the "STON" portion of the STONSHIELD mark
would be pronounced with a short "o" sound, while the "STONE"
portion of the ARMORSTONE mark would be pronounced with a
long "o" sound, resulting in the marks being dissimilar in
pronunciation.53 The TTAB found other meaningful differences
between the marks, including that the components "STON" and
"STONE" were spelled differently and appeared at different places
within the parties' marks and that the parties' marks each contained
a different number of syllables.4 The TTAB found the sixth DuPont
factor, the number and nature of similar marks used on similar
goods, to be neutral because neither party submitted evidence of the
number of third-party marks that were similar to StonCor's
STONSHIELD mark.5 5 The TTAB also considered StonCor's claim
that the ARMORSTONE mark is merely descriptive and found that
StonCor failed to provide sufficient evidence that the mark conveys
48. Id. (alteration in original).
49. Id. at 1329-30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 1330; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), (f) (2012) (prohibiting registration of
a mark on the principal register that is merely descriptive when used in connection
with the applicant's goods, unless the mark has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce).




55. Id. The Federal Circuit only analyzed DuPont factors one and six, which were
the only two factors that StonCor challenged on appeal. Id.
[Vol. 64:967
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information regarding a significant quality, characteristic, function,
or feature of the applied-for services.56
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with StonCor that the TTAB
erred in creating its own rule that the "o" in the STONSHIELD mark
would be pronounced with a short "o" sound." Evidence in the
record, including that StonCor's employees and sales force
pronounce the mark with a long "o" (as in "stone"), demonstrated
that consumers would pronounce the mark as "stone."58  Specialty
submitted no evidence to the contrary.59  The Federal Circuit
clarified that "[w] here a trademark is not a recognized word and the
weight of the evidence suggests that potential consumers would
pronounce the mark in a particular way, it is error for the Board to
ignore this evidence entirely and supply its own pronunciation.'
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the TTAB's error
regarding the pronunciation of StonCor's mark was harmless. The
court found that the TTAB's remaining findings that the parties'
marks are dissimilar" were all supported by substantial evidence and
sufficient to find that the first DuPont factor weighs against a
likelihood of confusion.62
As for the sixth DuPont factor, the Federal Circuit rejected
StonCor's arguments that the TTAB erred in discounting its evidence
that third parties use the term "armor stone" for similar products.6
The Federal Circuit explained that this DuPont factor considers the
impact that third-party marks have on the mark of the opposer, not the
mark of the applicant.' StonCor provided no credible explanation
for how the alleged evidence of third-party uses of "armor stone"
supported a finding of likelihood of confusion in this case.
56. Id. at 1330-31.
57. Id. at 1331-32.
58. Id. at 1331.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1332 (holding that "STON" is not a recognized word in the
English language).
61. The TTAB also found that the marks were different due to: (1) the different
spellings of "STON" and "STONE," (2) the different placement of those terms within
the parties' marks, (3) the different number of syllables in each of the parties'
complete marks, and (4) the different overall commercial impressions conveyed by
the marks in their entireties. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Evidence of similar third-party marks may be relevant to the strength or
weakness of the mark of the opposing party, which is probative on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. Id.
65. Id.
2015]
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Turning to StonCor's descriptiveness claim, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the TTAB's conclusion that there was no evidence in the
record to show that Specialty's mark was merely descriptive.66 The
TTAB held that the fact that Specialty's advertising materials showed
that it used the term "stone" in a descriptive manner did not render
its mark merely descriptive as a whole.67
The Federal Circuit found that the TTAB's findings on both the
issues of likelihood of confusion and descriptiveness were
supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the dismissal of
StonCor's opposition.6"
3. Longshore v. Retail Royalty Co.
In Longshore v. Retail Royalty Co.,6" the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's decision to refuse registration of Michael Longshore's
("Longshore") mark on the basis that it created a likelihood of
confusion with Retail Royalty Company's ("Retail Royalty") previously
registered mark.0
Longshore sought registration of a mark depicting a flying bird on
an intent-to-use basis.7 ' Retail Royalty opposed the application based
on a likelihood of confusion with its registered mark depicting a
flying bird under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.72 Both marks are
shown below.
Longshore's Mark Retail Royalty 's Mark
66. Id. at 1333.
67. Id.; see also Stoncor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., No. 91187787, 2012
WL 2588576, at *9-10 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2012) (explaining that StonCor's argument
regarding Specialty's descriptive use of the term "stone" was based on a
misunderstanding of the standard for descriptiveness in connection with a unitary
mark), aff'd, 759 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
68. Stoncor, 759 F.3d at 1333.
69. 589 F. App'x 963 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 964.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 965.
[Vol. 64:967
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Longshore sought registration of his mark for
A-shirts; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear,
hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Dress shirts; Hooded sweat shirts;
Knit shirts; Long-sleeved shirts; Night shirts; Opennecked shirts;
Polo shirts; Shirts; Shirts for suits; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-
shirts; Shortsleeved shirts; Sleep shirts; Sport shirts; Sports shirts
with short sleeves; Sweat shirts; T-shirts; Turtle neck shirts;
Wearable garments and clothing, namely, shirts, in Class 25."
Retail Royalty's mark is registered for " [w] earing apparel, clothing,
and clothing accessories, namely, bottoms, gym suits, tops, lingerie,
pants, shirts, shorts, skirts, sleep wear, sweaters, swim wear,
underwear, footwear, and headwear, in Class 25.""4 The mark is also
registered in Class 25 for "[w]earing apparel, clothing, and clothing
accessories, namely, beachwear, jackets, leg warmers, loungewear,
robes, and scarves.
7 5
Applying the DuPont factors, the TTAB looked at (1) the relevant
channels of trade and classes of purchasers, (2) the strength of the
registered mark, and (3) the similarity of the marks in terms of
appearance and overall commercial impression. Because the
application and registration listed a number of identical goods, the
TTAB presumed that the goods "would have the same channels of
trade and classes of purchasers."76 The TTAB also found "that Retail
Royalty's mark [wa]s arbitrary and inherently strong when used with
clothing."77 Lastly, because the two marks depict silhouettes of a
flying bird, the TTAB found the marks to be "similar in terms of
appearance and commercial impression."78 Balancing these
considerations, the TTAB found that Longshore's mark would likely
cause confusion with Retail Royalty's mark and, therefore, refused to
register Longshore's mark.79
Longshore appealed, arguing that the TTAB erred in (1)
"characterizing both images as depicting doves" when in fact one was
a bird of prey, (2) "determining that [the] marks would be used for
goods with the same channels of trade and classes of purchasers," and
73. Id. at 964.
74. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 965.
77. Id.
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
20151
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(3) "failing to consider a third-party's use of a bird silhouette design
when assessing the strength of Retail Royalty's mark."8"
With regard to Longshore's first argument, the Federal Circuit
held the TTAB's characterization of both marks as doves was
irrelevant.81 Design marks that are incapable of being spoken, the
court explained, must be evaluated primarily on the basis of their
"visual similarity."82  The Federal Circuit held that the TTAB's
conclusion that the marks had a similar appearance and overall
commercial impression was supported by substantial evidence.83
Longshore argued that his mark would be used for "inspirational
wear," which, on appeal, he described as "Universal Peacewear."84 By
comparison, he argued, Retail Royalty's mark was used only for
women's apparel. The Federal Circuit held, however, that because
Longshore's application "does not restrict the use of his mark to
inspirational or peace-related clothing" and because Retail Royalty's
registration is not limited to women's apparel, the "goods and
services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the
same class of purchasers."8"
Lastly, the Federal Circuit noted that the TTAB did consider third-
party use of the bird silhouette design depicted below:
Hollister Co. 's Mai*
HOLLISTER
CALIFORNIA
The TTAB had given little weight to this third-party use, however,
due to the lack of any evidence indicating the extent of the design's
usage or exposure to the public.86 The Federal Circuit agreed,
holding that the TTAB did not err in finding this use had limited
80. Id. at 965-66.
81. Id. at 965.
82. Id. (citing In reATV Network Ltd., 552 F.2d 925, 927 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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probative value when there was no evidence showing the extent of its
use or the public's awareness of its existence.
8 7
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's decision to refuse
registration of Longshore's mark.'
4. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc.
In In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc.,89 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's decision dismissing Franciscan Vineyards, Inc.'s ("Franciscan")
opposition to an application filed by Domaines Pinnacle, Inc.
("Domaines Pinnacle") to register the following mark in connection
with "apple juices and apple-based non-alcoholic beverages":"
Domaines Pinnacle, Inc.'s Mat*
Piri° A~drnnace
Franciscan opposed registration of Domaines Pinnacle's mark on the
grounds that it would likely cause confusion under section 2(d) of
the Lanham Act9 1 with its previously registered marks PINNACLES
for "wine" and PINNACLES RANCHES for "wines.92
The TTAB evaluated the opposition based on the following DuPont
factors: (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity and nature
of the goods, (3) the similarity of trade channels, (4) the similarity in
classes of consumers, (5) the fame of the prior mark, (6) the number
and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods, and (7) the
market interface between the parties.93
87. Id.
88. Id. at 967.
89. 593 F. App'x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at *1; Franciscan Vineyards, Inc. v. Domaines Pinnacle, Inc., No.
91178682, 2013 WL 5820844 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2013), afJ'd, In re Franciscan
Vineyards, Inc., No. 593 F. App'x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).
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With regard to the similarity of the marks, the TTAB found that the
word "PINNACLE" was the dominant element of Domaines
Pinnacle's mark and that despite the differences in wording and the
presence of the design element, the parties' marks were similar in
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.94 The
TTAB also found that the parties' respective goods travel in the same
channels of trade and will be encountered by the same classes of
consumers.95  These DuPont factors, the TTAB found, favored a
finding of likelihood of confusion.96
With regard to the similarity and nature of the goods, the TTAB
found the evidence insufficient to show that the parties' goods were
related for purposes of likelihood of confusion.97  Franciscan
presented evidence that the parties are competitors in Canada and
that Franciscan's parent company wholly owned three other
Canadian companies that sold wines and ciders. This, the TTAB
found, was insufficient to show relatedness of the goods and weighed
against a likelihood of confusion.
98
The TTAB found the remaining factors-namely, the fame of the
mark, the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods, and the market interface between the marks-were neutral.99
Balancing these factors, the TTAB found that the lack of evidence
showing relatedness of the goods outweighed the other factors and,
therefore, dismissed Franciscan's opposition.0 0
On appeal, Franciscan argued that Franciscan's wines and
Domaines Pinnacle's "'apple juices and apple-based non-alcoholic
beverages' were related goods" and that its mark was famous for
likelihood-of-confusion purposes.' However, the Federal Circuit
upheld the TTAB's finding that Franciscan "failed to present
evidence to show that the goods at issue were related." 102 It, too,
found that the evidence that the parties were competitors in Canada,
and that Franciscan's parent company wholly owned three other
94. Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 2013 WL 5820844, at *3.
95. Id. at *6.
96. Id. at *3-4, *6.
97. Id. at *7.
98. Id. at *8.
99. Id. at *4-5, *8.
100. Id. at *8-9.
101. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F. App'x 997, 999 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2014).
102. Id.
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Canadian companies that sold wines and ciders, was insufficient to
prove that the goods were related.'0 3
The Federal Circuit further agreed that the TTAB's prior decision
in In re Jakob Demmer KG,'°4 which had affirmed a trademark
examiner's refusal of a mark based on the relatedness of the goods
"cider" and "wine," was not controlling."5 The TTAB had applied a
more permissive standard in Jakob Demmer due to the ex parte nature
of that proceeding.0 6 Here, due to the inter partes nature of the
proceeding, the burden was on the opposer to introduce evidence of
the relatedness of the goods.107  Franciscan did not introduce
sufficient evidence demonstrating the relatedness of the goods, and
the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB did not err in refusing to
adopt a general rule that cider and wine were per se related.'
The Federal Circuit did not find Franciscan's remaining arguments
persuasive and upheld the TTAB's finding that there was no
likelihood of confusion between the marks.09
5. In re St. Helena Hospital
In In re St. Helena Hospital,"0 the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB's
refusal to register St. Helena Hospital's ("St. Helena") TAKETEN mark
based on a likelihood of confusion with a prior registration for the
mark TAKE 10! and remanded for further proceedings."'
St. Helena operates a ten-day residential heath improvement
program at its California facility under the mark TAKETEN." 2  It
applied to register the mark with the PTO for "[h] ealth care services,
namely, evaluating weight and lifestyle health and implementing
weight and lifestyle health improvement plans in a hospital-based
residential program.""' The PTO examiner refused registration,
citing a likelihood of confusion with a prior registration for the mark
TAKE 10! covering "printed manuals, posters, stickers, activity cards
and educational worksheets dealing with physical activity and physical
103. Id.
104. 219 U.S.P.Q. 1199 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
105. In re Franciscan Vineyards, Inc., 593 F. App'x 997, 1000.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 999-1000.
109. Id. at 1000.
110. 774 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
111. Id. at 749.
112. Id.
113. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fitness .... "114 St. Helena appealed the refusal of its registration to
the TTAB, which considered DuPont factors one through four and
held that the balance of factors supported a finding of a likelihood of
confusion, and, thus, affirmed the refusal of St. Helena's mark."5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the TTAB's ruling
on the similarity of the marks in appearance, sound, meaning, and
overall commercial impression.116 The TTAB had concluded that the
marks were "phonetically identical," that the "word 'ten' and the
numeral '10"' have the same meaning, and that, in context, both
marks share the same connotation-namely, to take a break from
work. i ' St. Helena argued that the TTAB erred because it
disregarded three important differences between St. Helena's
TAKETEN mark and the cited TAKE 10! mark: (1) the spelling out
of the word "ten" versus the numeral "10;" (2) the absence of a space
between "TAKE" and "TEN;" and (3) the absence of an exclamation
point in the TAKETEN mark.18
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that there were some
differences in the appearance of the marks but found that nothing in
the record supported St. Helena's arguments that the differences
were sufficient to distinguish them.119 As to sound, the Federal
Circuit rejected St. Helena's argument that the exclamation point in
the cited mark alters its pronunciation such that it would be uttered
with emphasis while the TAKETEN mark would be spoken in a
relaxed fashion.
121
Turning to the connotation of the marks at issue, St. Helena had
argued that the parties' respective specimens of record showed that
their marks actually conveyed different messages, with St. Helena's
TAKETEN connoting a ten-day health and fitness program and the
cited TAKE 10! mark implying taking ten minutes out of one's
day.12' The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the parties' specimens
might indeed have referred to different measures of time, i.e., days
114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 749-50.
116. Id. at 750-51.
117. Id. at 750.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 750-51 (noting that the proper inquiry is not to do "a side-by-side
comparison" but, rather, to consider the marks "in light of the fallibility of memory"
(quoting San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d
683, 685 (C.C.P.A. 1977))).
120. Id. at 751.
121. Id.
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and minutes.22 However, neither of the parties' descriptions of
goods specified a measure, or length of time, or otherwise clarified
the meaning of the "TEN" and "10" portions of the marks.123 Thus,
the Federal Circuit held there was substantial evidence for the
TTAB to find that the marks conveyed the same meaning-namely,
to take a break.
24
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the TTAB's conclusion that
the marks conveyed the same commercial impression, thus rejecting
St. Helena's contention that the exclamation point in the TAKE 10!
mark made that mark "more of a shout or command as compared to
the suggestion engendered by St. Helena's mark 'TAKETEN.
1 25
The Federal Circuit next addressed the TTAB's findings on the
similarities between the parties' goods and services. The TTAB had
held that printed materials and health care services provided under
similar marks are sufficiently related such that consumers would
believe they come from the same source.2 6 For support, it relied on
"instances in which written materials were provided in connection
with [health care] services similar to those of St. Helena" and found
that the goods and services are complementary.
2 7
The Federal Circuit held that there was a lack of substantial
evidence to support this finding. It noted that most of the printed
materials cited by the TTAB were not actually in the record, and that
the printed materials made of record to support the relatedness of
goods/services argument were distinguishable.'28 The Federal Circuit
went on to clarify that "[i] n situations like the present, in which the
relatedness of the goods and services is obscure or less evident, the




125. Id. at 751-52.
126. Id. at 752.
127. Id.
128. One of the two materials considered by the Federal Circuit consisted of a
newsletter for the Duke Diet & Fitness Center, which featured the Duke trademark
but was not the same type of printed material covered by the cited registration. Id.
Thus, it failed to show use of the same trademark in connection with both health
care services and the relevant printed materials at issue. Id. The other material
considered by the Federal Circuit was an exercise worksheet from Hilton Head
Health, which did not bear the relevant trademark that was also allegedly used to
identify that entity's health care services. Id.
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goods and services are 'used together.""29 This "something more"
rule, previously applied to determine the relatedness of food
products with restaurant services, was extended by the Federal Circuit
to apply "whenever the relatedness of the goods and services is not
evident, well-known or generally recognized.""1 ' Because the PTO
failed to show that the printed materials covered by the cited
registration were generally considered related to St. Helena's health
care services, or that there was "something more" in the record to
establish that relatedness, the TTAB's conclusion on this factor was
not supported by substantial evidence.'3
On the channels-of-trade factor, St. Helena argued that the cited
registrant's goods were targeted to educators, who were not the same
target customers as for its health care services.'32 The PTO argued,
on the other hand, that the cited registration was not so limited and
that the parties' respective specimens showed that they both
promoted their goods and services through similar channels-
namely, the Internet.' The Federal Circuit found that both sides'
arguments lacked merit. It agreed with the PTO that while some of
the goods in the cited registration were limited to use by educators,
not all of the goods were so limited. It further found that the PTO's
conclusion about advertising via websites was unsupported, stating
that "[a] dvertising on the Internet is ubiquitous and 'proves little, if
anything, about the likelihood that consumers will confuse similar
marks used on such goods or services."134
As to the degree of consumer care, the TTAB had determined the
factor was neutral.3 5  Although conceding that St. Helena's
customers would exercise a high degree of care in purchasing its
health care services, the TTAB found no evidence that consumers
would exercise the same high level of care in analyzing printed
materials received while participating in the health care services.
13 6
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the TFAB's conclusion on this
factor and held that there was no evidence "that the level of care
129. Id. at 753-54 (quoting Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
130. Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Kinbook, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 866 F. Supp. 2d 453, 470-71
n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2012)).
135. Id. at 755.
136. Id.
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exercised by consumers before entering a health-care program is any
different from the level of care exercised once in the program. "17
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the TTAB's decision,
finding that substantial evidence did not support the refusal of St.
Helena's registration in view of the differences between the goods




In In re Geller, 39 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TIAB's refusal to
register the mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA on the
ground that the mark contains matter that may disparage American
Muslims in violation of section 2 (a) of the Lanham Act.4 '
Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer sought registration of the mark
STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA based on an intent to use
the mark for "[p] roviding information regarding understanding and
preventing terrorism."141 The PTO examiner refused to register the
mark pursuant to the disparagement provisions of section 2 (a) of the
Lanham Act, and the applicants appealed the refusal to the TTAB
142
The TTAB first considered the meaning of the mark and found the
term "Islamisation," had two likely meanings: (1) a religious meaning
and (2) a political meaning.4 3 The religious meaning described "the
conversion or conformance to Islam."'44  The political meaning
described "a sectarianization of a political society through efforts to
'make [it] subject to Islamic law."" 4
The TTAB then concluded that the mark might be disparaging to
American Muslims under both meanings of Islamisation. With
respect to the religious meaning, it found the mark signaled that
religious Islamisation is undesirable and must be stopped.'46 When
considered in connection with the identified services, the mark
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Geller v. Patent & Trademark
Office, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015).
140. Id. at 1357; see infra text accompanying note 152 (quoting section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act).
141. In re Geller, 751 F.3d at 1357 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id.
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directly associated Islam with terrorism.14 7 With respect to the political
meaning, the TTAB found the mark identified political Islamisation
with terrorism even though not all political Islamisation mandates
the use of violence or terrorism.148 Thus, the TTAB held that both
meanings of the mark might be disparaging to American Muslims.
49
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the appellants argued that
there was no substantial evidence to support the TTAB's finding
that the proposed mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA
might be disparaging and that the TTAB relied on arbitrary and
anecdotal evidence in making its determination.5 ' The Federal
Circuit disagreed.5'
Under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, a mark may be refused
registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises.., matter which may
disparage ... persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute .... "152 The
Federal Circuit confirmed that the TTAB's test in In re Lebanese Arak
Corp. 5 3 was the proper one to apply in analyzing a section 2(a) refusal
for disparagement.154 The test requires consideration of
(1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking
into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship
of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the
goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the
marketplace in connection with the goods or services; and
(2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may
be disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.
155
The Federal Circuit clarified that the determination of whether a
mark may be disparaging "is a conclusion of law based upon
underlying factual inquiries." 156 Thus, the TTAB's factual findings
had to be reviewed for substantial evidence, and its ultimate
conclusion as to the registrability of the had to be reviewed de novo.
57
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1357-58.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1358.
151. Id. at 1362.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
153. 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
154. In re Geller, 751 F.3d at 1358.
155. Id. (quoting In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1217).
156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id.
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With regard to the first prong of the disparagement test, the
appellants argued that the TTAB ignored the overwhelming evidence
that the sole likely meaning of "Islamisation" is its political meaning.'58
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the TTAB did not err in
concluding that Islamisation has a likely religious meaning in
addition to its political meaning.9 The Federal Circuit found the
TTAB's reliance on dictionaries, essays posted on the appellants'
website under the mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA,
and readers' comments posted on the appellants' website supported
such a finding.6 It further upheld the TTAB's finding that although
additional evidence, such as congressional testimony, established the
political meaning of Islamisation, the political meaning was not the
sole meaning of the term.'
With regard to the second prong of the disparagement test, the
appellants had argued that the TTAB's evidence-namely, statements
by Muslims noting their concern about anti-Muslim sentiment that
automatically associates Islam with terrorism-had nothing to do with
their mark.62 The Federal Circuit disagreed and noted that this
argument merely restated the appellants' argument concerning the
term's meaning under the first prong.6 ' In fact, the "[a]ppellants
conceded at oral argument that their mark [was] disparaging under a
religious meaning of Islamisation." 6
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the TTAB that the appellants'
mark might be disparaging in the context of its political meaning.
Although the appellants challenged the TTAB's finding that political
Islamisation includes nonviolent activity, the Federal Circuit found
nothing in the record to suggest that the political meaning of
Islamisation requires violence or terrorism.165 In fact, the appellants'
own evidence contradicted this contention. As a result, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the TTAB properly found that associating
peaceful political Islamisation with terrorism would be disparaging to
a substantial composite of American Muslims.'66
158. Id. at 1358-59.
159. Id. at 1359.
160. Id. at 1359-60.
161. Id. at 1360.




166. Id. at 1361-62.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's refusal of the appellants'
mark STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA. 16 7 The appellants
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari
on January 12, 2015.'6
C. Infringement
In Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc.169 -a set of
consolidated appeals from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana involving claims brought by numerous
manufacturers, distributors, and vendors of "snowball" products-the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's rulings on a number of
trademark claims brought by various parties in the action.'
The case involved "snowball [s]," which the Federal Circuit
explained are "confection[s] of ice shavings, flavored with various
syrups and typically served in ... cone-shaped paper cup[s].17 ' The
lawsuit before the district court involved "members of every segment
of the snowball industry from manufacturers of the icemakers and
syrups to distributors to local snowball vendors."172
Parties Southern Snow Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Southern Snow")
and Simeon, Inc. ("Simeon") had asserted rights in the mark
SNOBALL against SnoWizard, Inc. ("SnoWizard").' The jury found
that Southern Snow and Simeon owned valid and enforceable rights
in the SNOBALL trademark but that SnoWizard had not infringed
the mark "and that the suit against SnoWizard was groundless,
brought in bad faith, or brought for purposes of harassment."'74 The
district court sustained the jury's verdict.'75
On appeal, Southern Snow and Simeon challenged, on two bases,
the finding that their infringement claim was groundless. First, they
argued that their claim could not be groundless because the jury
upheld the validity of their trademark.176 Second, they argued "that
the finding of groundlessness [could not] be reconciled with a jury
verdict that their related state unfair competition claim was not
167. Id. at 1362.
168. Geller v. Patent & Trademark Office, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015).
169. 567 F. App'x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
170. This Article addresses only the trademark-related issues discussed in the decision.
171. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 948.
172. Id.
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groundless.""' The Federal Circuit rejected the appellants' first
argument, recognizing that "it is entirely possible to have a valid
trademark... and nevertheless file a lawsuit in bad faith or for
purposes of harassment.""178  It similarly rejected their second
contention, noting that there may have been "better evidence" in the
jury's finding with respect to bad faith and the infringement claim
than there was for the unfair competition claim. 1
79
SnoWizard, meanwhile, had alleged claims of infringement of a
number of its own trademarks against various other parties in the
case.' At issue in the appeal was the district court's finding on a
motion for new trial or for judgment as a matter of law in which the
court found that substantial evidence supported the verdicts of
infringement of SnoWizard's marks by Southern Snow, Snow
Ingredients, Inc., and Parasol Flavors, LLC ("Parasol").'8' The district
court had found that these parties each used SnoWizard's marks or a
"colorable imitation" of the marks on identical goods.'82 These
accused parties argued on appeal that their uses of their respective
house brands on the accused products avoided a likelihood of
confusion and that the district court did not find that SnoWizard had
infringed the SNOBALL mark based on the same type of evidence.8
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, noting that the
district court relied on evidence that fit squarely within the similarity-
of-marks, similarity-of-goods, and intent factors in the likelihood-of-
confusion analysis.'84 The court further found that the jury was free
to find that the display of the parties' house brands was insufficient to
avoid a likelihood of confusion with SnoWizard's marks.'85
The Federal Circuit next addressed a claim of infringement of the
mark ORCHID CREAM VANILLA asserted against SnoWizard by
Plum Street Snoballs ("Plum Street")."' The jury found the mark to
be valid, enforceable, and infringed, and awarded Plum Street
damages in the form of lost profits.8 7 The district court upheld the
177. Id.
178. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 955.
182. Id. at 955-56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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jury's verdict.'88 On appeal, SnoWizard argued against the findings of
validity and infringement and asserted a laches defense.8 9
Regarding the validity of the mark, SnoWizard asserted that Plum
Street previously consented to a judgment that the alleged mark was
generic for flavor concentrates and, thus, was not enforceable as a
trademark.9 ' The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that while
the mark ORCHID CREAM VANILLA may be generic for flavor
concentrates, SnoWizard did not argue that it is generic for snowballs
themselves, which is how SnoWizard used the mark.'9' The Federal
Circuit also affirmed the jury's finding of infringement of that mark
by SnoWizard, citing evidence that SnoWizard copied the mark.192 As
to SnoWizard's laches defense, in which it argued that Plum Street's
claim should be barred due to a thirteen-year delay in filing suit, the
Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the equitable defense
should have been submitted to the jury and noted that the district
court was correct in rejecting it because SnoWizard failed to raise the
issue in the final pretrial order."'
The Federal Circuit next addressed a question of first impression
before it-whether a claim for fraud under section 38 of the Lanham
Act' 4 may only be asserted on the basis of a registered trademark.'
As the appeals court explained, section 38 provides that
[a]ny person who shall procure registration in the Patent and
Trademark Office of a mark by a false or fraudulent declaration or
representation, oral or in writing, or by any false means, shall be
liable in a civil action by any person injured thereby for any
damages sustained in consequence thereof.'96
Southern Snow, Parasol, and Simeon brought claims against
SnoWizard under section 38 based on fraudulent statements
SnoWizard allegedly made while prosecuting a number of the
trademarks it asserted in the lawsuit.'97 On SnoWizard's Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the district court dismissed
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 956-57.
191. Id. at 957.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 1120 (2012) (providing that a person shall be liable for civil
damages for procuring registration of a trademark via "a false or fraudulent
declaration or representation" or "by any false means").
195. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 957-58.
196. Id. at957 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1120).
197. Id. at 958.
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the section 38 claims against those SnoWizard marks that had been
applied for but had not yet been registered at the time."' These
appellants challenged that Rule 12 (b) (6) dismissal, arguing that the
Lanham Act does not require that the marks at issue actually be
registered.9 9 They argued further that they had been prejudiced by the
misapplication of the statute because some of the marks at issue had
subsequently matured to registration during the course of the litigation.2 °0
The question of whether a section 38 claim can be asserted on the
basis of a pending application (as opposed to a registration) was a
question of first impression in both the Federal Circuit and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 21 and had only been addressed
at the appellate level by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, which held that a section 38 claim may only be asserted when
the mark at issue is registered.2 2 The Seventh Circuit held that a
party may only be "injured" under section 38 when a competitor's
mark is registered and used and not by mere application for the
mark.203  "Unless the PTO grants the application.., the
consequences of registration (as opposed to use) do not come to
pass, and no damages are 'sustained in consequence thereof.'
20 4
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's treatment of
the issue and concluded that Southern Snow, Parasol, and Simeon
were not prejudiced when they were barred from asserting their
section 38 claims against SnoWizard's then-unregistered marks.20 5
Because SnoWizard was able to assert infringement whether its marks
were registered or not, there could be no consequence arising from
the applications themselves, even if they had fraudulently been
prosecuted before the PTO.2"6 The Federal Circuit noted that the
parties could have amended their pleadings or filed a new suit once
198. Id.; see FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (6) (permitting a party to move to dismiss a civil
action for "failure to start a claim upon which relief may be granted").
199. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 958.
200. Id.
201. The district court from which the appeal was brought is located in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Federal Circuit reviews decisions of a
district court not unique to trademark law according to the law of the regional circuit
from which the appeal is brought. E.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46
F.3d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
202. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 958 (citing Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am.
Farm Bureau Fed'n, 876 F.2d 599, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1989)).
203. Country Mut. Ins. Co, 876 F.2d at 600-01.
204. Id.
205. S. Snow Mfg. Co., 567 F. App'x at 958-59.
206. Id.
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the marks at issue became registered.0 7 It thus affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the section 38 claims.20 8
D. Generic Mark
In In re Nordic Naturals, Inc.,2° the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's refusal to register the mark CHILDREN'S DHA for nutritional
supplements on the ground that the applied-for mark was generic.210
Nordic Naturals, Inc. ("Nordic") applied to register the mark
CHILDREN'S DHA for "nutritional supplements containing DHA."21'
DHA, the Federal Circuit explained, is "the abbreviation for
docosahexaenoic acid, an omega-3 fatty acid that assists in brain
development."2 2 During the prosecution of its application, Nordic
disclaimed the term "DHA" apart from the mark as a whole.213
Nordic also clarified that its goods are designed for use by children.214
After the PTO examiner refused registration of the mark as generic,
Nordic appealed to the TTAB.
215
The TTAB agreed with the examiner that the mark was generic,
citing, among other things, third-party uses of the phrase "children's
DHA" to describe products similar to those of Nordic.216 It held, in
the alternative, that the mark was merely descriptive and had not
acquired secondary meaning.
217
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began its analysis by restating the
general rule that "[a] mark is generic if the relevant public primarily
uses or understands the mark to refer to the category or class of
goods in question.1 8  Such a term cannot acquire secondary
meaning and cannot be registered as a trademark.21 9
Nordic accepted the TTAB's findings that the relevant category of
goods was nutritional supplements containing DHA and that the
relevant public for the goods was parents or other adults seeking
207. Id. at 959.
208. Id.
209. 755 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
210. Id. at 1341-42.
211. Id. at 1341 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id.





218. Id. (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
219. Id.
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those goods for children. It contended, however, that the TTAB
erred in concluding that the mark was generic.
20
The evidence of record, the Federal Circuit explained, consisted of
dictionary definitions of the words "child" and "DHA," twelve third-
party websites using the phrase "children's DHA" for various DHA
products intended for children, and online articles and excerpts from
books about nutrition that used the phrase in a descriptive manner.22'
Starting with the dictionary evidence, the Federal Circuit held that
nothing in the definitions of "child" or "DIA" suggested that the
term "children's DHA" could have any source identifying function.222
The definitions, the court explained, show that "children's" describes
a category of DHA rather than a brand of DHA.223
Further, the Federal Circuit found the evidence of third-party
usage supported the finding.224 For example, one website contained
the language "no other children's DHA supplement can match the
ease and convenience of Animal Parade DHA. ' ' 225 Another article
stated that " [w] hen looking for a children's DHA supplement, experts
agree that quality and safety are the most important factors."226 The
court concluded that these and several other uses in the record
demonstrated that third parties use the phrase "'children's DHA' to
describe the category of DHA products for children."227
Nordic also argued that while the phrase "children's DHA
supplement" might be used descriptively by others, CHILDREN'S
DHA by itself is not used in such a manner.228 It pointed to the fact
that it was allegedly the first party to use that term and that it invested
considerable money and time in marketing its goods under the
mark.229 It countered the PTO's evidence of third-party descriptive
use with its own evidence consisting of declarations from its retailers,
its own advertising materials, and third parties' use of the alleged
mark to refer to Nordic's products.2 3  Nordic argued that the
"mixture of usages"-referring both to Nordic's own goods, and to
220. Id. at 1343.
221. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id. at 1342 (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the goods of others-could not amount to clear evidence of
genericness, citing the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.231 for support.232
The Federal Circuit rejected Nordic's argument, distinguishing In
re Merrill Lynch23 on the ground that the instant record lacked third-
party references recognizing Nordic as the source of the goods.
2 34
The court noted that even references that used "children's DHA" to
refer to Nordic's goods also used the phrase in a generic manner.2 35
It also found Nordic's declarations from retailers were of limited
value because retailers were not members of the relevant public for
the goods and Nordic primarily prepared the declarations.2 36  The
Federal Circuit contrasted the declarations with the evidence
submitted in In re Merrill Lynch, which had included unsolicited
source-indicating references.
2 37
Finding substantial evidence supported the TTAB's conclusion that
the phrase "children's DHA" is generic, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the refusal to register the mark and did not address the issue of
acquired distinctiveness.238
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Gutier v. Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH & Co. KG
In Gutier v. Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH & Co. KG,
239
the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's cancellation of Micky
Gutier's ("Gutier") registrations for the marks XY COSMETICS and
XY SKINCARE after Gutier and appellee Hugo Boss Trade Mark
Management GmbH & Co. KG ("Hugo Boss") settled an infringement
action following a summary judgment in favor of Hugo Boss.2 41
231. 828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
232. In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d at 1344 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, 828
F.2d at 1571).
233. In In re Merrill Lynch, the Federal Circuit concluded that the TTAB did not
prove the mark CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT was generic where multiple
third-party references in the record recognized Merrill Lynch as the source of the
mark. 828 F.2d at 1371.
234. In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d at 1344.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1344-45.
238. Id. at 1345.
239. 555 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
240. Id. at 947-48.
[Vol. 64:967
2014 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS
Gutier owned federal registrations for the marks XY COSMETICS
and XY SKINCARE. He filed a trademark infringement action
against Hugo Boss in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona based on Hugo Boss's use of the marks XY HUGO and XX
HUGO for skin care products,241 and Hugo Boss counterclaimed
seeking cancellation of Gutier's registrations.242 Ruling on Hugo
Boss's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that
Gutier lacked valid protectable rights in the marks at issue because he
had not engaged in bona fide use of the marks in commerce.43 The
district court further found that Hugo Boss had priority of use of its
marks.244 It granted summary judgment for Hugo Boss and, among
other things, ordered the cancellation of Gutier's XY COSMETICS
and XV SKINCARE marks pursuant to section 37 of the Lanham Act.245
After the district court's judgment, the parties participated in a
mediation conference and entered into a "Mediation Conference
Memorandum" in which they agreed to mutually release all claims
against one another and to stipulate to entry of a final judgment in
favor of Hugo Boss consistent with the district court's summary
judgment order.246 No further judgment was entered by the district
court, and the parties treated the summary judgment order as the
district court's finaljudgment. Among other things, the memorandum
permitted Gutier to continue to use but not to register his marks.247
The TTAB received a copy of the district court's judgment and the
parties' memorandum and ordered Gutier's registrations cancelled
pursuant to section 37.248 Gutier appealed the resulting cancellation
of his registrations.249
241. XY Skin Care & Cosmetics, LLC v. Hugo Boss USA, Inc., No. CV-08-01467-
PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 2382998, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009).
242. Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 948.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012) (constituting section 37 of the Lanham Act
and providing that "[i]n any action involving a registered mark the court may
determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole
or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with
respect to the registrations of any party to the action").
246. Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 948.
247. Id. at 949.
248. Id. Hugo Boss had filed cancellation actions with the TTAB during the
pendency of the litigation, which the TTAB suspended in view of the district court
proceedings. Id. at 948. Upon receipt of the district court's judgment, the TrAB
dismissed Hugo Boss's separate cancellation action as moot. Id.
249. Id. at 948.
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Gutier argued that the TTAB erred in cancelling his marks because
he had filed his six-year declarations of use under section 8 of the
Lanham Act25 and affidavits of incontestability under section 15 of
the Lanham Act.25' The Federal Circuit rejected Gutier's argument,
noting that the validity of the district court's judgment and order
under section 37 is unaffected by the previous filings of the sections 8
and 15 affidavits.252
Gutier also argued that the TTAB's cancellation of his registrations
contravened the terms of the parties' memorandum, which expressly
permitted Gutier to continue using the marks at issue.253 The Fedcral
Circuit noted, with ease, that giving Gutier the right to continue to
use his marks was in no way inconsistent with the parties' agreement
that he not be permitted to continue owning registrations for the
marks.254 It noted further that the parties had agreed not to appeal
or seek relief from the final judgment of the district court.2 5
The Federal Circuit declined to address other factual issues that
Gutier raised on appeal, finding that they were merely attempts to re-
litigate the district court's ruling.2 56  Thus, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the TTAB's order cancelling Gutier's marks.
2 57
B. M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG
In M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 58 the Federal Circuit granted
M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc.'s ("Berger") motion to dismiss a cross-appeal
filed by Swatch AG ("Swatch") in connection with Berger's appeal of
a refusal by the TTAB to register its 1MATCH trademark after
opposition by Swatch.25 9
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (requiring that a declaration of use be filed by the
sixth anniversary of a registration to avoid cancellation).
251. See id. § 1065 (setting forth the conditions and requirements to obtain
incontestability, including that there not be any proceeding involving the validity of
the trademark registration pending before the PTO or any court); see also Gutier, 555
F. App'x at 949 (listing Gutier's arguments on appeal to the Federal Circuit).
252. Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 949. The Federal Circuit also noted that Gutier
could not have satisfied the statutory requirements of section 15. Id. When Gutier
filed his section 15 affidavits, the legal proceedings involving his right to maintain
his registrations had already been pending before the district court. Id.; see 15
U.S.C. § 1065.
253. Gutier, 555 F. App'x at 949.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 949-50.
257. Id. at 950.
258. 559 F. App'x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
259. Id. at 1010.
[Vol. 64:967
2014 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS
Berger had applied to register the mark IWATCH with the PTO
based on an intent to use.260 Swatch opposed the application based
on a likelihood of confusion with its SWATCH mark and for lack of a
bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.2 6' The TTAB
sustained the opposition and refused registration of Berger's mark,
finding that Berger lacked the necessary intent to use.262 However,
the TTAB dismissed Swatch's likelihood-of-confusion claim due to
the substantial differences between the marks SWATCH and
WATCH. 263 Berger appealed the refusal of its registration, and
Swatch cross-appealed the TTAB's decision dismissing its likelihood-
of-confusion claim.26
The Federal Circuit noted that a party cannot appeal from a
decision ruling in its favor, and clarified that this rule applies in
trademark proceedings before the TTAB.265 It further explained that
Swatch was free to reargue the likelihood-of-confusion issue through
its responsive brief as an appellee in Berger's appeal.266 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit dismissed Swatch's cross appeal.267
C. Cigar King, LLC v. Corporacion Habanos, S.A.
In Cigar King, LLC v. Corporacion Habanos, S.A.,268 the Federal
Circuit dismissed an appeal by Cigar King, LLC ("Cigar King") after
the TTAB cancelled two of its trademark registrations, finding the
appeal moot because Cigar King failed to file declarations of use as
required under section 8 of the Lanham Act.
269
260. Id. at 1009.
261. Id.; Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.) v. M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc., No.
91187092, 2013 W.L. 5655834, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2013), appeal dismissed in pall,
559 F. App'x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
262. M.Z. Berger & Co., 559 F. App'x at 1009-10.
263. Id.; Swatch AG, 2013 WL 5655834, at *7-8, *15.
264. M.Z. Berger & Co., 559 F. App'x at 1010.
265. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2012)) (granting a right of appeal to
parties who are dissatisfied with a decision of the TTAB).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. 560 F. App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
269. See id. at 1000-02 (determining that it was impossible for the court to
overturn the ITAB's termination of Cigar King's trademark registrations because, in
effect, Cigar King relinquished control over its trademarks by its failure to file a
section 8 declaration); see 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (outlining the general requirements that
a registrant file an affidavit stating that the registered mark is in use in commerce for
the goods or services covered in the registration by no later than six months
following the sixth anniversary of the registration).
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Cigar King obtained federal registrations for the marks HAVANA
SOUL and HABANA LEON for "cigars made with Cuban seed
tobacco.2 7  Corporacion Habanos S.A. ("Habanos") petitioned to
cancel Cigar King's registrations on the ground that the "marks
[were] geographically deceptive and deceptively misdescriptive."
271
After a number of procedural missteps by Cigar King,272 including
its failure to comply with an order following a motion to compel
discovery, the TTAB entered judgment for Habanos as a sanction
against Cigar King for its "willful noncompliance" with TTAB orders
and its "deliberate action to impair petitioner's ability to present its
case."'273 Cigar King immediately filed an appeal of the TTAB's order
cancelling its registrations.2 74  Subsequent to the notice of appeal,
Cigar King failed to file affidavits of use under section 8 of the
Lanham Act,2 75 resulting in the PTO's cancellation of both
registrations at issue in the proceeding.276
In its appeal, Cigar King argued that Habanos lacked standing to
seek cancellation of its marks because, as a Cuban national, it was
legally foreclosed from selling goods in the United States and, thus,
could not be damaged.277 Habanos argued that the Federal Circuit
270. Cigar King, LLC, 560 F. App'x at 1000 (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Id. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark that
"[clonsists of or comprises... deceptive... matter." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Further,
section 2(e) (1) prohibits registration of a mark that is "deceptively misdescriptive" of
the applied-for goods. Id. § 1052(e)(1). Finally, section 2(e)(3) prohibits
registration of a mark that is "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" of
the goods. Id. § 1052(e) (3).
272. After initially failing to respond to the petition for cancellation, Cigar King
successfully set aside the notice of default that the TTAB issued against it. Cigar King,
LLC, 560 F. App'x at 1000.
273. Id. at 1001 (quoting Corporacion Habanos, S.A. v. Cigar King, Ltd., No.
92053245, 2013 WL 6056505, at *3 (T.T.A.B. June 12, 2013), appeal dismissed, 560 F.
App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
274. Id.
275. Section 8 of the Lanham Act requires the registrant to file an affidavit
stating that the mark is in use in commerce for the goods or services covered by
the registration by no later than six months following the sixth anniversary of the
registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a)-(b). Failure to file the affidavit will cause the
PTO to cancel the registration. Id. § 1058(a). Based on the February 12, 2007
registration date of its marks, Cigar King's affidavits under section 8 were due by
August 13, 2013, approximately two months after the appeal was filed. Cigar King,
LLC, 560 F. App'x at 1000.
276. Cigar King, LLC, 560 F. App'x at 1001.
277. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that Cigar King never presented this argument
before the TTAB because judgment was entered as a sanction before the proceeding
reached the merits stage. Id.
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need not address the standing issue because the appeal was rendered
moot when Cigar King failed to file its section 8 affidavits and when
the PTO consequently cancelled Cigar King's registrations.278
The Federal Circuit described the test for mootness as a
determination of "whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a
difference to the legal interests of the parties.' 7 9 Because Cigar
King's registrations were cancelled under section 8, which the
appellant did not dispute, the registrations would remain cancelled
even if the Federal Circuit agreed with Cigar King on the merits.
Accordingly, the court found the appeal was moot.
2 0
The Federal Circuit also considered whether the TTAB's
underlying judgment should be vacated. It concluded that vacatur
was not appropriate in this case, since Cigar King caused the
mootness of the appeal by its own unilateral action of failing to file its
affidavits of use.28 1 The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot
and declined to vacate the TTAB'sjudgment.
282
D. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co.
In Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co.,283 a legal dispute
that has spanned nearly two decades, the Federal Circuit found that
the petitioner, Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, doing business as
Cubatabaco ("Cubatabaco"), had a statutory cause of action to seek
cancellation of two trademark registrations owned by General Cigar
Co., Inc. ("General Cigar") .2 4 General Cigar owned two U.S.
registrations, issued in 1981 and 1995, for the COHIBA mark for
cigars.285 Cubatabaco--a Cuban entity-owns rights in the COHIBA
mark in Cuba and sells its cigars throughout the world although not
in the United States.286 In 1997, Cubatabaco sought registration of its
mark in the United States under section 44(e) of the Lanham Act.287
278. Id.
279. Id. (quoting Nasatka v. Delta Scientific Corp., 58 F.3d 1578, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1002.
282. Id.
283. 753 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015).
284. Id. at 1271.
285. Id. at 1271-72.
286. Id. at 1272.
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012) (allowing an applicant to rely on a foreign
registration as a basis to register its mark in the United States without having actual
use of the mark in U.S. commerce prior to registration). Cubatabaco based its
2015]
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It did so pursuant to the general license provided under the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations (CACR), which permit Cuban entities that
are otherwise prohibited from engaging in transactions with the
United States to conduct transactions related to the registration of
trademarks before the PTO.28 s
The PTO refused registration of Cubatabaco's mark, citing General
Cigar's two prior registrations for the COHIBA mark.28 9 In response,
Cubatabaco petitioned the PTO for cancellation of General Cigar's
registrations and subsequently sued General Cigar for trademark
infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York.29° Cubatabaco sought an injunction against General
Cigar's use of the COHIBA trademark in the United States and
cancellation of its registrations before the PTO.21' The TTAB
suspended the cancellation proceeding pending the outcome of the
district court litigation.2 2
The district court ultimately ruled that General Cigar had
abandoned its trademark rights in the COHIBA mark during five
years of non-use between 1987 and 1992 and ordered the
cancellation of its 1981 registration on grounds of abandonment.
293
It found that Cubatabaco had acquired ownership of the COHIBA
mark in the United States294 between the time of General Cigar's
abandonment of its 1981 registration and the filing date of its
application that led to its 1995 registration.295
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the finding of infringement and vacated the cancellation of
General Cigar's registrations as well as any injunctive relief that the
application on a Cuban registration for the same mark. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco,
753 F.3d at 1272.
288. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d at 1272.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. Cubatabaco had obtained a special license from the U.S. Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which permitted it to initiate legal
proceedings before the U.S. courts with respect to the COHIBA trademark. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. The district court found that Cubatabaco acquired rights in the United States
pursuant to the famous marks doctrine, which states that the party with a well-known
mark has priority over its use. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d
462, 468 (2d Cir. 2005). The COHIBA mark was sufficiently well known in the
United States before General Cigar resumed use of the mark in 1992, so Cubatabaco
was entitled to priority over use of the COHIBA mark. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco,
753 F.3d at 1273; Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 468.
295. Empresa CubanaDelTabaco, 753 F.3d at 1271-73.
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district court had granted.296 It held that the district court could not
grant the injunctive relief sought by Cubatabaco because such a
remedy would involve a transfer of property prohibited under section
515.201 of the CACR297 since Cubatabaco would acquire ownership of
the mark.2" The Second Circuit did not rule on the district court's
finding that General Cigar had abandoned its 1981 registration for
non-use and dismissed the issue as moot.
299
General Cigar subsequently moved the district court to order the
TTAB to dismiss Cubatabaco's petition for cancellation and to deny
Cubatabaco's application for registration of the COHIBA mark.
3 0 1
While the district court denied General Cigar's motion as untimely,
30 1
it specified in dicta that the TIAB should decide any preclusive effect
from the Second Circuit's decision. Thus, the district court did not
explicitly decide whether the cancellation of General Cigar's
registrations by the TTAB would constitute a prohibited transfer
under the CACR.3 2 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of General Cigar's motion, finding that it was
not an abuse of discretion for the district court to let the TTAB
decide what preclusive effect its previous decision should be given.0
After the TTAB cancellation proceeding resumed, General Cigar
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Cubatabaco
lacked standing to pursue the cancellation action and that its petition
was barred by issue and claim preclusion.0 4 The TTAB granted
General Cigar's motion and dismissed Cubatabaco's petition, but
expressly declined to reach the merits of the preclusion question in
view of Cubatabaco's lack of standing.5 Cubatabaco appealed the
TTAB's grant of summary judgment to the Federal Circuit.
296. Id. at 1273.
297. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2014) (prohibiting certain transactions involving
Cuba and Cuban nationals, including transfers of property between Cuba and Cuban
nationals and persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States).
298. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 753 F.3d at 1273.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. The district court denied the motion as untimely because it was styled as a
motion to amend ajudgment-which, under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, must be filed within ten days after entry of the judgment-and General
Cigar missed the cut-off date for filing. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aftd, 541 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2008).
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The Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of whether
Cubatabaco had standing to seek cancellation of General Cigar's
registrations. It held that because the PTO refused Cubatabaco's
own application to register the COHIBA trademark by citing General
Cigar's earlier registered marks, Cubatabaco had reasonable belief
that it was being damaged by those registrations and, therefore, had a
real interest in cancelling them."6 Thus, Cubatabaco had a cause of
action to seek cancellation under the Lanham Act.07
The Federal Circuit criticized the TTAB for having relied
exclusively on the Second Circuit's decision to find a lack of
standing.0 8 It noted that the TTAB interpreted the Second Circuit's
decision as prohibiting Cubatabaco from ever acquiring a property
interest in the COHIBA mark under the CACR and, therefore, as
denying Cubatabaco any legitimate commercial interest sufficient to
confer standing.0 9 However, the Federal Circuit explained that the
Second Circuit did not address whether Cubatabaco could seek
cancellation before the TTAB; instead, the Second Circuit decided
only that the CACR prohibited the grant of injunctive relief. l Thus,
the Federal Circuit determined that the Second Circuit's holding was
irrelevant to the TTAB proceeding.3 ' The court added that
"[b]efore the Board, Cubatabaco enjoys affirmative authorization to
seek cancellation emanating from the general license provided by the
CACR" and quoted a letter from the Office of Foreign Assets Control
to Cubatabaco's counsel, which stated that the provisions of the
CACR "may be relied on... to petition to cancel a prior registration
of a trademark where these actions relate to the protection of a
trademark in which Cuba or a Cuban national general license has an
interest."3 2
The Federal Circuit explained that a pending application that has
been refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with a
prior registered mark is sufficient to establish that a petitioner
seeking to cancel the prior registration "is the type of party Congress
authorized under 15 U.S.C. § 1064."'l' The desire of a party to own a
federal registration-with its "attendant statutory advantages"-is a




310. Id. at 1274-75.
311. Id. at 1275.
312. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. Id.
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"legitimate commercial interest" that satisfies the threshold
requirements to bring a cancellation action.314 The Federal Circuit
explained further that the Second Circuit's holding was limited to
finding that the district court could not enjoin General Cigar from
using the COHIBA mark under the CACR's prohibition against
property transfers."1 5 The Second Circuit did not address whether
Cubatabaco could seek cancellation before the TTAB.316
The Federal Circuit then turned to the questions of issue and claim
preclusion."7 As to issue preclusion, the court identified the various
issues raised in Cubatabaco's petition and ruled that each was either
not addressed by, or not necessary to, the Second Circuit's final
judgment, or was not identical to the issues addressed by the Second
Circuit.1 ' Further, regarding claim preclusion, the Federal Circuit
held that the "array of differences in transactional facts between
claims of infringement and cancellation" rendered issue preclusion
inapplicable in the case. 19
Finding that Cubatabaco had a cause of action to seek cancellation
of General Cigar's registrations before the TTAB and that neither
issue nor claim preclusion barred its petition for cancellation, the
Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB's summary judgment decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings.32 °  General Cigar
appealed the Federal Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, and
the Court denied certiorari on February 23, 2015.21
E. Cutino v. Nightlife Media, Inc.
In Cutino v. Nightlife Media, Inc.,322 the Federal Circuit overturned
the TTAB's dismissal of Michael Cutino's ("Cutino") opposition
against Nightlife Media, Inc. ("Nightlife Media"), finding that the
TTAB abused its discretion when it decided not to consider one of
Cutino's registered marks in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.23
314. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1276. The TTAB did not reach the preclusion question in its grant of
summary judgment, but the Federal Circuit decided to address the issue given that
the parties fully briefed it and that the TTAB and federal court proceedings had
created an extensive record on the claim. Id.
318. Id. at 1276-78.
319. Id. at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id.
321. 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015).
322. 575 F. App'x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
323. Id. at 891.
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Nightlife Media applied to register the mark NIGHTLIFE
TELEVISION for "Video-on-demand transmission services, Internet
broadcasting services, Broadcasting services via mobile and handsets,
Satellite television broadcasting, and Television broadcasting."324
Cutino opposed Nightlife Media's application based on a likelihood
of confusion with three of his prior registered marks and based on
deceptiveness and false suggestion under section 2 (a) of the Lanham
Act.125  Although counsel represented him when he filed his
opposition, Cutino elected to proceed pro se before the TTAB and
the Federal Circuit. 
3 26
Cutino owned registrations for the marks NEW YORK'S
NIGHTLIFE, for a "Monthly Magazine Dealing Primarily with Things
to Do and See and Places to Go in the State of New York"; LONG
ISLAND'S NIGHTLIFE, for a "Monthly Magazine Dealing Primarily
with Things to Do and Places to Go in the Long Island and
Surrounding Areas and Also Featuring Other Articles of General
Interest"; and NIGHTLIFE, for "magazines of general interest" and
"television programming services."3 27  Together with his notice of
opposition, Cutino submitted into the record photocopies of the
registration and renewal certificates for his three registered marks as
well as printouts from the PTO's database showing the current status
and tide of two of his registrations, LONG ISLAND'S NIGHTLIFE
and NEW YORK'S NIGHTLIFE.32 ' He did not attach status and title
printouts for his NIGHTLIFE registration.329
Cutino did not present testimony or introduce evidence during his
testimony period.330  He subsequently served an untimely pretrial
disclosure statement, which was met with a motion to strike by the
applicant, and attempted to submit evidence after the close of his
testimony period.33' The TTAB struck the disclosures and evidence
from the record as untimely.
332
The final record considered by the TTAB consisted of the parties'
pleadings, the file for the opposed application, Cutino's registrations
324. Id. at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted).
325. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 152 (quoting section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act).
326. Cutino, 575 F. App'x at 889.
327. Id. at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for the marks LONG ISLAND'S NIGHTLIFE and NEW YORK'S
NIGHTLIFE, and a deposition of Nightlife Media's owner and
founder.3 The TTAB declined to consider Cutino's NIGHTLIFE
mark because he failed to submit a status and title copy as required by
the Trademark Rules.3 4 Based on this record, the TTAB found that
Cutino did not pursue, and consequently waived, his claims for
deceptiveness and false suggestion under section 2(a) because the
required elements of the claim were not established.333
Turning to the likelihood-of-confusion claim, the TTAB evaluated
the DuPont factors and found that (1) the dissimilarities between
Cutino's LONG ISLAND'S NIGHTLIFE and NEW YORK'S
NIGHTLIFE marks and Nightlife Media's NIGHTLIFE TELEVISION
mark outweighed the similarities, (2) the parties' respective goods
and services were sufficiently distinct, (3) there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that their goods and services traveled in the
same channels of trade, and (4) the remaining factors were
neutral.336  Thus, the TTAB held that there was no likelihood of
confusion and dismissed the opposition.3 7
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the TTAB had
abused its discretion in disregarding Cutino's NIGHTLIFE
registration.338 It held that Nightlife Media's admissions that Cutino
owned three marks, including the NIGHTLIFE mark, were sufficient
to treat the NIGHTLIFE registration as part of the record.339
Although Nightlife Media purported in its answer to admit only
that Cutino was the owner of the NIGHTLIFE mark, but not
necessarily the owner of the corresponding pleaded registration for
that mark, Nightlife Media's failure to deny Cutino's allegation in the
notice of opposition that he owned the registration for NIGHTLIFE
constituted an admission as to that registration.34" The Federal
Circuit further held that Nightlife Media's admission regarding
ownership of the NIGHTLIFE registration (i.e., title) also established
333. Id. at 890.
334. Id. at 889-90. Nightlife Media admitted in its answer that Cutino owns the
NIGHTLIFE mark. Id. at 890. However, the TTAB held that Nightlife Media's
admission does not provide any evidence regarding Cutino's actual use of the mark
or what goods and services are offered under the mark and, thus, could not make
Cutino's NIGHTLIFE mark part of the record for consideration. Id.
335. Id. at 890.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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the registration's active status because "[o]ne technically does not
own a registration that is not in force and effect. "341
Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB had abused its
discretion in refusing to consider Cutino's registration for the mark
NIGHTLIFE and remanded the decision back to the TTAB to address
the likelihood of confusion between Cutino's NIGHTLIFE mark and
Nightlife Media's NIGHTLIFE TELEVISION mark.
3 42
CONCLUSION
2014 was a relatively busy year for the Federal Circuit in terms of
trademark decisions. While it may be argued that none of the
opinions introduced major changes to trademark practice, several of
them provided valuable lessons for practitioners, including, for
example, Cutino's holding that an opposer's failure to submit a status
and title copy of a pleaded registration may not be fatal to its
consideration as evidence, and the determination in Southern Snow
that a claim for fraud under section 38 of the Lanham Act may only
be based on a registered trademark, and not on a pending
application. The court's disagreement with the TTAB's conclusions
in St. Helena may also be instructive in future proceedings because of
its ruling that the PTO show "something more" than the mere fact
that goods and/or services are used together when making the case
that they are related for likelihood-of-confusion purposes.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 891-92. Cutino did not appeal the TTAB's findings on likelihood of
confusion with his other two marks, LONG ISLAND'S NIGHTLIFE and NEW
YORK'S NIGHTLIFE. Id. at 891.
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